Marius F. Jung

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Philosophy, Graduate Student

Philosophy +11

Address: Mainz, Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany

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Papers

Are there Counterexamples to the Immunity Principle? Some Restrictions and Clarifications - A Commentary on Caleb Liang

Our commentary focuses on the sense of experiential ownership and its implications for the Immuni... more Our commentary focuses on the sense of experiential ownership and its implications for the Immunity Principle. In general we think that Liang elaborates the self-as-object and the self-as-subject in an interesting and refreshing way. Nevertheless, there are some problems that we want to address. (1) First, we argue that the sense of experiential ownership could not misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership. (2) Second, we argue that neither the sense of experiential ownershipin particular nor phenomenal states in general are eligible for identity judgments.(3) Then we claim that the two alleged counterexamples actually do not provide
any valid argument against IEM. (4) We close by evaluating whether it makessense to talk about the Immunity Principle as a non-trivial property, or whether the relevant properties are just mispredication or misguided reference.

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Communicative Agency and Ad Hominem Arguments in Social Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre Jacob

A central point in Jacob’s paper focuses on the incompatibility of Grice and Millikan’s account o... more A central point in Jacob’s paper focuses on the incompatibility of Grice and Millikan’s account of communicative agency. First, the Gricean mindreading thesis is incompatible with Millikan’s direct perception account. Second, the account of cooperative
devices, defended by Millikan, contradicts the Gricean separability thesis in a broad sense. While I agree with Jacob that these positions are indeed incompatible, I will shift focus and concentrate on issues concerning social epistemology
with regard to communicative agency. A main issue in social epistemology concerns the accessibility of the speaker’s reliability. How could the hearer remain epistemically vigilant without using fallacious reasoning? (i) I argue that the hearer, in order to be epistemically vigilant, could commit a local ad hominem attack, a process of inductive Bayesian reasoning which is an epistemic tool for assessing the speaker’s reliability. (ii) Compared to this, a global ad hominem attack is a fallacious kind of reasoning, because it undermines knowledge transmission and it cannot be calculated in Bayes’ Theorem. (iii) The account of a local ad hominem attack fits with Grice’s mindreading thesis, which is incompatible with Millikan’s account of direct perception. (iv) The Gricean separability thesis
could better explain occurrences of ad hominem attacks than Millikan’s assumption that speaker and hearer are cooperative devices.

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Are there Counterexamples to the Immunity Principle? Some Restrictions and Clarifications - A Commentary on Caleb Liang

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Communicative Agency and Ad Hominem Arguments in Social Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre Jacob

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Marius F. Jung

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